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INCUBATOR OR INDIVIDUAL?: THE LEGAL AND POLICY
DEFICIENCIES OF PREGNANCY CLAUSES IN LIVING
WILL AND ADVANCE HEALTH CARE
DIRECTIVE STATUTES
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.... To
compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to
submit it to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an
indignity, an assault and a trespass; and no order or process, com-
manding such an exposure or submission, was ever known to the
common law in the administration of justice between
individuals. ... '
The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions.2
INTRODUCTION
The right of competent individuals to forego medical treatment
as an expression of their right to bodily integrity and autonomy has
been consistently recognized by the United States Supreme Court for
the last one-hundred years.' Although the Court has often balanced
the interests of the individual with the interests of the state to deter-
mine the extent of the right to forego medical treatment,4 the basic
1. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891).
2. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Casey 1) (holding
that Constitution limits a state's authority to interfere with an individual's basic decisions
regarding bodily integrity); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (recognizing a right to refuse medical
treatment); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting individual infringes a liberty interest); Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753 (1985) (invalidating surgical removal of bullet from murder suspect as unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (recog-
nizing right to be free from unreasonable bodily restraints); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (holding that involuntary stomach-pumping violates due process); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (recognizing liberty interest of individual with regard to
undergoing unwanted treatment); Camden & Suburban Ry. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900)
(holding that court has no common-law power to order an individual to undergo surgical
procedures).
4. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261 (holding that individual's liberty interest must be
balanced against competing state interests); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
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underlying right of competent individuals to forego medical treat-
ment' and to protect their right to bodily integrity and autonomy has
not been questioned. State appellate courts have also upheld the
right of a competent individual to forego medical treatment.6
While upholding the rights of competent individuals to forego
medical treatment in most circumstances7 has been the easy case for
federal and state courts, upholding the rights of incompetent' individ-
(holding that state's interest in administering antipsychotic drugs to violent, mentally-ill
inmate outweighed the inmate's liberty interest); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (recognizing that reasonable state regulations may override individual's liberty
interest).
5. This Comment recognizes, as do most feminist theories, that the framing and nam-
ing of an issue is a political act. As such, this Comment does not use the morally laden
terms "right-to-die," "euthanasia," or "suicide." To do so would detract from the true issue
involved: the right of individuals to choose what medical treatment, if any, is to be per-
formed upon their bodies. See Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying
and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519, 527 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993); DeGrella v. Elston, 858
S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. 1992); In reA.C., 573 A.2d
1235 (D.C. 1990); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); In reJobes, 529 A.2d
434 (NJ. 1987); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In reTorres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); In reColyer, 660 P.2d
738 (Wash. 1983); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980).
7. The cases uniformly recognize that the right of an individual to forego medical
treatment is not absolute, and that it can be balanced against the countervailing interests
of the state in its role as parenspatriae. These interests are: (1) the preservation of life; (2)
the protection of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide; and, (4)
the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. See, e.g., Brophy, 497
N.E.2d at 634; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 ("[W]hether respondent's constitutional
rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the
relevant state interests." (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982));John D.
Hodson, Annotation, Judicial Power to Order Discontinuance of Life-Sustaining Treatment, 48
A.LR.4th 67 (1986) (analyzing state and federal cases pertaining to court orders to discon-
tinue life support). For a good discussion of "protecting innocent third parties," which is
the interest most frequently argued by states when intervening in the decision-making pro-
cess of individuals to forego medical treatment, see In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
1993), corrected, 18 FLA. L. WKLY., S 636 (Fla. 1993).
8. What constitutes incompetency depends upon the statute in question. Generally,
the term is used to describe a patient that is either brain-dead, in a persistent vegetative
state, an end-stage condition or a terminal condition. It is the "[1] ack of ability, legal quali-
fication, or fitness to discharge a required duty. A relative term to show want of physical or
intellectual or moral fitness." IRVING J. SLOAN, THE RIGHT To DIE: LEGAL & ETHICAL
PROBLEMS 142 (1988).
Brain-death refers to "whole brain death" where "all functions of the brain, including
cortical, subcortical, and brainstem functions, are permanently lost." FRED PLUM &JEROME
B. POSNER, THE DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR & CoMA 9 (3d ed. 1980). Persistent vegetative state
"describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal controls. It main-
tains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains diges-
tive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned
responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the
529
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uals to forego medical treatment has been more difficult.9 The semi-
nal case involving the rights of incompetent patients to forego
medical treatment was issued by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
1976. In re Quinlan1° held that an individual, whether competent or
incompetent, had the right to forego medical treatment at common-
law as well as under a state and federal constitutional right to pri-
vacy.' Since Quinlan, several state appellate courts have also held
that the right to forego medical treatment can be found in state and/
or federal constitutional law, usually based on the right to privacy.' 2
This constitutional right to forego medical treatment has also been
found to exist by several federal courts."3
surroundings in a learned manner." In reJobes, 529 A.2d at 438; see also PRESIDENT's COM-
MISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV-
IORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 174-75 (1983)
(hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION) ("Personality, memory, purposive action, social in-
teraction, sentience, thought, and even emotional states are gone. Only vegetative func-
tions and reflexes persist.").
End-stage condition is a statutory creation which appears in the Maryland Health Care
Decisions Act of 1993. The Act defines an end-stage condition as "an advanced, progres-
sive, irreversible condition caused by injury, disease, or illness: (1) That has caused severe
and permanent deterioration indicated by incompetency and complete physical depen-
dency; and (2) For which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, treatment of the
irreversible condition would be medically ineffective." MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-
601(i) (1994). A terminal condition is defined in Maryland as "an incurable condition
caused by injury, disease, or illness which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
makes death imminent and from which, despite the application of life-sustaining proce-
dures, there can be no recovery." Id. § 5-601(q) (1994).
9. For example, there are no United States Supreme Court cases directly on point
which deal with the rights of an incompetent patient to refuse medical treatment; but see
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-80.
10. 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. NewJersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
11. Id. at 663.
12. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987) (federal and state);
Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (federal and state);
Foody v. Manchester Mem. Hosp., 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. 1984) (federal); Severns v. Wil-
mington Medical Ctr., Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (federal); In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235
(D.C. 1990) (federal); In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989), affid, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (state);John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (federal); In re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984) (fed-
eral); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977)
(federal and state); In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984) (state); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 647
(federal and state); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio C.P. 1980)
(federal); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738 (Wash. 1983) (federal and state); cf. Cruzan v. Har-
mon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417-18 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nora. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (holding that neither right to refuse medical treatment nor
right to privacy are absolute).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 491 & nn.18-19 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) ("The right to be free of unwanted physical invasions" is
protected by the Constitution); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1984)
(same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988)
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Though Quinlan and its progeny of cases have recognized the
right of an incompetent individual to forego medical treatment,1 4 the
cases have consistently turned on the question of how this right could
be exercised and protected. While state appellate courts have come
up with varying answers in case law, state legislatures originally reacted
by enacting living will statutes. 15 Durable power of attorney for health
care and advance health care directive statutes soon followed.' 6 By
enacting such prior directive17 statutes, state legislatures aimed to cod-
ify the common-law right to forego medical treatment,'8 though not
(recognizing constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment); Tune v. Walter Reed
Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that competent pa-
tient has the right to order removal of life-support).
14. See, e.g., McConnell v. Beverly Enters.-Conn., 553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989); In reA.C.,
573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990);John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d
921 (Ha. 1984); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1993); Guardianship of Doe, 583
N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1512 (1992); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419
(NJ. 1987); Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987); State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
15. In 1976, California became the first state to enact a "Natural Death Act." See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185 et seq. (1976). Generally, living will statutes allow compe-
tent adults to prepare documents "authorizing or requiring the withholding or withdrawal
of specified medical treatments" upon some triggering event (usually a terminal condition,
a persistent vegetative state, an end-stage condition, or brain death) that has "render[ed]
the declarant incompetent to make such a decision personally." Gregory Gelfand, Living
Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 737, 740. See supra note 8. "The Living Will
is a means for the individual to manage his death by prospective guidelines and is pre-
mised on the informed consent of the person prior to an irreversible coma or a state of
being disabled or maimed." SLOAN, supra note 8, at 31.
16. Durable power of attorney for health care statutes allow an individual (the princi-
pal) to appoint another individual (agent, surrogate, or proxy) to act as the principal's
agent in the event that the principal becomes incompetent and is unable to make health
care decisions. See, e.g., Massachusetts Health Care Proxies Act, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
201D, § 2 (West Supp. 1993).
Advance health care directive statutes allow individuals to state, in advance, what type
of medical care they would want if they should become incompetent at a future date, or to
name a surrogate or proxy to make any decision regarding health care that the individuals
would have been able to make if competent. See PRESIDErr'S COMMISSION, supra note 8, at
136. See also Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Living Wills: Validity, Construction, and Effect, 49
A.L.R.4th 812 (1992) (analyzing state and federal cases on the validity of living wills);
James M. Jordan, Incubating for the State: The Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and
Brain-Diad Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REv. 1103, 1105 n.8 (1988) (discussing advance direc-
tives). Many advance health care directive statutes also set up surrogate decision-making
mechanisms whereby an individual who has not been appointed, but who is within a hier-
archy established by statute, can make health care decisions for one who has become in-
competent and has made no prior directive. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605
(1994).
17. This Comment will use "prior directive" as a shorthand method of referring to
living wills, durable power of attorneys for health care, and advance health care directive
statutes or documents.
18. See infra note 57.
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to limit or supersede it, and to recognize, as some courts already had,
the constitutional right to forego life-sustaining treatment if one be-
comes incompetent.' 9
As of this writing, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
enacted such statutes."° Of these fifty-one jurisdictions, eighteen have
19. See Gelfand, supra note 15, at 770; see alsoJanice MacAvoy-Snitzer, Pregnancy Clauses
in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1280 (1987) ("Living will statutes provide legisla-
tively defined mechanisms for exercising the constitutional right to bodily integrity, which
encompasses the right of competent individuals to designate the course of their medical
treatment.").
20. Alabama Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); Alaska Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act, ALAsl.A STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to -.100 (1993); Arizona Living Wills &
Health Care Directives Act, Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3262 (Supp. 1993); Arkan-
sas Rights of the Terminally or Permanently Unconscious Act, Am. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-
201 to -218 (Michie Supp. 1989); California Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1993); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -109 (1989 & Supp. 1993); Connecticut Removal of Life Support
Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -580c (Supp. 1993); Delaware Death with
Dignity Act; DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); District Of Columbia Natural
Death Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); Florida Health Care Advance Direc-
tives Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101 to .401 (West 1986); Georgia Living Wills Act, GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -11 (Supp. 1994), and Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
Act, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (1991); Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act,
HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (1991 & Supp. 1993); Idaho Natural Death Act, IDAHO
CODE §§ 394501 to -4509 (1993); Illinois Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/
1 to 35/10 (Smith-Hurd 1993) and Health Care Surrogate Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755,
para. 40/1 to 40/55 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Indiana Living Wills & Life-Prolonging Proce-
dures Act, IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-364-1 to -21 (Burns 1993 & Supp. 1994); Iowa Life-Sus-
taining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to A.12 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994), and
Durable Power of Attorney For Health Care Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1 to B.12 (Supp.
1994); Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 109 (1992); Kentucky
Living Will Act, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622 to .644 (Baldwin 1993); Louisiana Natural
Death Act, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West 1992); Maine Uniform Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1993);
Maryland Health Care Decisions Act, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618
(1994); Massachusetts Health Care Proxies Act, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1-17
(West Supp. 1994); Michigan Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 700.495 to .497 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); Minnesota Living Will Act, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 145B.01 to .17 (West Supp. 1994); Mississippi Withdrawal of Life-Savings Mecha-
nisms Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 4141-101 to -121 (1993), and Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Act, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-151 to -183 (1993); Missouri Uniform Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon 1992); Montana Rights
of the Terminally Ill Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1993); Nebraska Health
Care Power of Attorney Act, NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-3404 to -3432 (Supp. 1993); Nevada
Uniform Act on Rights of the Terminally Ill, NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 449.535 to .690 (1991),
and Nevada Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Nmv. REv. STAT. §§ 449.800 to
.860 (1991); New Hampshire Living Wills Act, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to H:15
(Supp. 1993), and Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, N.H. REv. STAT. §§ 137-
J:I to J:16 (Supp. 1993); New Jersey Advance Directives for Health Care Act, NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1994); New Mexico Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991); New York Health Care Agents & Proxies Act, N.Y. Pun.
HEALTH LAw §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 1993); North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act,
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only living will statutes,2' four have only durable power of attorney for
health care statutes,2 2 eighteen have integrated 2 3 statutes, 24 and
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1993); North Dakota Uniform Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (1991 & Supp. 1993), and Durable Power of
Attorney for Health Care Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-02 to -18 (1991 & Supp. 1993);
Ohio Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, OHIO REv. CODE Ann. §§ 2133.01
to .15 (Anderson 1994); Oklahoma Rights of the Terminally Ill or Persistently Unconscious
Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 63, §§ 3101.1 to .16 (West Supp. 1994); Oregon Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care and Directive to Physicians Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605 to
.650 (1989 & Supp. 1994); Pennsylvania Advance Directive for Health Care Act, PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5401-5416 (Supp. 1994); Rhode Island Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, R.I.
GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.11-1 to .11-14 (Supp. 1993), and Health Care Power of Attorney Act, R.I.
GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.10-1 to .10-12 (1989 & Supp. 1993); South Carolina Death with Dignity
Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); South Dakota Living
Wills Act, S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 34-12D-1 to -22 (1994); Tennessee Right to Natural
Death Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1994); Texas Natural Death Act,
TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001 to .021 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); Utah
Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to-1118 (1993 & Supp.
1994); Vermont Terminal Care Document Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987),
and Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467
(1989 & Supp. 1993); Virginia Health Care Decisions Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -
2993 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994); Washington Natural Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.122.010 to .920 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); West Virginia Natural Death Act, W. VA.
CODE §§ 16-30-2 to -13 (1991 Supp. & 1994), and Health Care Surrogate Act, W. VA. CODE
§§ 16-30B-1 to -16 (Supp. 1994); Wisconsin Natural Death Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to
.15 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993), and Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 155.01 to .80 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); Wyoming Living Will Act, Wvo. STAT. §§ 35-22-
101 to -109 (1994).
21. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-I to -10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100 (1993); ARL
CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie Supp. 1989); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430
(1989); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (1991 & Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-36-4-
1 to -21 (Burns 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 109 (1992); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622 to .644 (Baldwin 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10
(West 1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01 to .15
(Anderson 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-12D-1 to -22 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to .920 (West 1992
& Supp. 1994); Wvo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1994).
22. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (West Supp. 1994); MICH. COmp. LAws
ANN. §§ 700.495 to .497 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-3404 to -3432
(Supp. 1993); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw ANN. §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 1993).
23. An integrated statute provides for both a living will and a durable power of attorney
for health care. Such a statute generally allows an individual to execute one or both such
prior directives, and it also generally provides for what is to occur when no prior directive
exists and the patient is incompetent to make decisions regarding health care.
24. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3262 (Supp. 1993); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -109 (1989 &
Supp. 1993); CON. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -580c (Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2501-2508 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.101 to .401 (West 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-
4501 to -4509 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994); MINN. STAT.
ANN., §§ 145B.01 to .17 (West Supp. 1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp.
1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.1 to .16
533
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eleven have separate living will and durable power of attorney for
health care statutes.25
Of the eighteen jurisdictions with only living will statutes, eight
forbid physicians to comply with the terms of a living will throughout
the term of a patient's pregnancy, 26 four forbid a physician from im-
plementing the living will of a pregnant woman if the fetus could pos-
sibly be brought to the point of live birth with the continued use of
life-sustaining treatment, 27 one forbids a physician from implement-
ing the living will of a pregnant woman if the fetus could be brought
to the point of live birth and the mother would not be further harmed
(West Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.605 to .650 (1989 & Supp. 1994); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5401-5416 (1989 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1993); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 672.001 to .021 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1993 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994).
25. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -11 (1991 & Supp. 1994) and GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-
1 to -13 (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/1 to 35/10 (Smith-Hurd 1993) and ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/1 to 40/55 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to
.12 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) and IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1 to .12 (Supp. 1994); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (1993) and Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-151 to -183 (1993);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.535 to .690 (1991) and NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 449.800 to .860 (1991);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to H:15 (Supp. 1993) and N.H. REv. STAT. §§ 137-J:1 to
J:16 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.4-01 to .4-14 (1991 & Supp. 1993) and N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.5-01 to .5-18 (1991 & Supp. 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 23-4.11-1 to .11-
14 (1989 Supp. & 1993) and R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.10-1 to .10-12 (1989 & Supp. 1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 3451-3467 (1989 &
Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-2 to -13 (1991 & Supp. 1994) and W. VA. CODE §§ 16-
30B-1 to -16 (Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to .15 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993) and
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01 to .80 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
26. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (4) (1990); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-6 (1991 & Supp. 1993);
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-48(d) (Burns 1993 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
28,103(a)(4) (1992); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.626(2) (Baldwin 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 459.025 (Vernon 1992); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (c) (West 1992 & Supp.
1994); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102(b) (1994).
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) ("If I
have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my physician, this direc-
tive shall have no force or effect during the course of my pregnancy.").
27. ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.040(c) (1993); Asx. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Michie Supp.
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (1993); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2133.06(B) (An-
derson 1994).
See, e.g., ARm CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (Michie Supp. 1989) ("The declaration of a
qualified patient known to the attending physician to be pregnant must not be given effect
as long as it is possible that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with continued
application of life-sustaining treatment.").
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or made to suffer from being kept on life-support systems, 28 and five
do not have pregnancy clauses.29
Of the four jurisdictions with only durable power of attorney for
health care statutes, one forbids a physician from implementing the
terms of a durable power of attorney for health care throughout the
term of a patient's pregnancy,30 one forbids a physician from imple-
menting the durable power of attorney for health care of a pregnant
woman if the fetus could possibly be brought to the point of live birth
with the continued use of life-sustaining treatment,3' and two do not
have a pregnancy clause.32
Of the eighteen jurisdictions with integrated statutes, eight forbid
physicians to comply with the terms of a prior directive throughout
the term of a patient's pregnancy,33 three forbid a physician from im-
plementing the terms of the prior directive of a pregnant woman if
the fetus could possibly be brought to the point of live birth with the
continued use of life-sustaining treatment,34 one forbids a physician
28. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-10 (1994) ("Notwithstanding a declaration
made pursuant to this chapter, life-sustaining treatment and artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion shall be provided to a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty .... such procedures will not maintain the woman in such a way as to permit the
continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful to
the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by medication.").
29. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to
.10 (1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1994).
30. MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 700.496(7) (c) (Supp. 1994) ("This designation cannot
be used to make a medical treatment decision to withhold or withdraw treatment from a
patient who is pregnant that would result in the pregnant patient's death.").
31. NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-3417(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) ("[A] ttorney in fact shall not have
authority ... to make any decision when the principal is known to be pregnant that will
result in the death of the principal's unborn child and it is probable that the unborn child
will develop to the point of live birth with the application of health care.").
32. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (West Supp. 1994); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw
ANN. §§ 2980-2994 (McKinney 1993).
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFE Y CODE § 7189.5(c) (West Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 19a-574 (Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(d) (1983); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4504(4) (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4(B)(IV) (a) (West Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-77-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFrTv CODE ANN. § 672.019
(West 1992 & Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1109 (1993).
See, e.g., CA.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5(c) (West Supp. 1994) ("The declaration
of a qualified patient known to the attending physician to be pregnant shall not be given
effect as long as the patient is pregnant.").
34. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113(2) (West 1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13(3) (Supp. 1993). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13(3)
(West Supp. 1994) ("[I]n the case of a living will of a patient that the attending physician
knows is pregnant, the living will must not be given effect as long as it is possible that the
fetus could develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining
treatment.").
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from implementing the prior directive of a pregnant woman if the
fetus could be brought to the point of live birth and the mother would
not be further harmed or made to suffer from being kept on life-sup-
port systems,3 5 and six do not have a pregnancy clause.36
Of the eleven jurisdictions with separate living will and durable
power of attorney for health care statutes, three forbid physicians to
comply with the terms of a living will throughout the term of a pa-
tient's pregnancy.3' The durable power of attorney for health care
statutes in these jurisdictions, however, vary in their treatment of an
incompetent pregnant woman. While Mississippi's durable power of
attorney for health care statute does not contain a pregnancy clause 3
New Hampshire's statute states that an incompetent pregnant woman
must be maintained until live birth if, to a reasonable degree of medi-
cal certainty, the unborn child could be brought to term.3 9 Wiscon-
sin's statute allows the surrogate to make whatever decisions the prior
directive authorizes.4"
Five of the eleven jurisdictions with separate living will and dura-
ble power of attorney for health care statutes forbid a physician from
implementing the living will of a pregnant woman if the fetus could
possibly be brought to the point of live birth with the continued use of
life-sustaining treatment." Yet, the durable power of attorney for
health care statutes vary widely in their treatment of an incompetent
pregnant woman. Georgia's statute allows a surrogate to make the
same decisions that the principle could, Illinois's statute states that a
living will supersedes a durable power of attorney for health care,4"
35. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5414(a) (Supp. 1993) ("Notwithstanding the existence of a
declaration or direction to the contrary, life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration
must be provided to a pregnant woman . . . unless, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty... life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration: (1) will not maintain the
pregnant woman in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of
the unborn child; (2) will be physically harmful to the pregnant woman; or, (3) would
cause pain to the pregnant woman which cannot be alleviated by medication.").
36. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3262 (Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-
GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-53 to -78 (West Supp. 1994); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605 to .650 (1989 & Supp.
1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1994).
37. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(1) (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:14(I) (Supp.
1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(2) (West 1989 & Supp. 1992).
38. See generally Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-151 et seq. (1992).
39. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:2(V)(c) (Supp. 1992).
40. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.20(6) (Supp. 1993).
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(1) (1991 & Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para.
35/39(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6(2) (West 1989); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 449.624(4) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.11-6(c) (Supp. 1993).
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-36-4 (1991).
43. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/15 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
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Iowa's statute does not have a pregnancy clause," Nevada's statute
does not allow a surrogate to consent to abortion,4 5 and Rhode Is-
land's statute does not allow a surrogate to consent to the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if the declarant is pregnant
as long as it is probable that the fetus could be brought to the point of
live birth.46
Of the eleven jurisdictions with separate living will and durable
power of attorney for health care statutes, one forbids a physician
from implementing the living will of a pregnant woman if the fetus
could be brought to the point of live birth and the mother would not
be further harmed or made to suffer from being kept on life-support
systems.47 Under this particular durable power of attorney for health
care statute, however, a surrogate may not consent to abortion.4" Two
jurisdictions do not have pregnancy clauses in either statute.49
Thus, the majority of states in this country give a woman fewer
constitutional and common-law rights if she is pregnant and incompe-
tent than if she were either (a) competent and pregnant, (b) compe-
tent and chose to have an abortion before fetal viability, or (c)
incompetent and without a prior directive.50 The diversity of statutes
44. See generally IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.1 et seq. (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
45. NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.850 (1991).
46. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.10-5(c) (Supp. 1993).
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23.06.4-07 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23.06.5-03(5) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
49. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251 et seq. (1987 & Supp. 1993), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3451 et seq. (1989 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1994), and
W. VA. CODE § 16-30B-1 et seq. (Supp. 1994).
50. It should be noted that the Attorney General of Alaska has issued an informal opin-
ion questioning the constitutional validity of that state's pregnancy clause in light of the
Supreme Court's Griswold-Roejurisprudence in privacy right cases. See Op. (Inf.) Att'y Gen.
Alaska 523 (1986). The Attorney General of Wisconsin has also issued an opinion ques-
tioning the constitutionality of the pregnancy clause in Wisconsin's living will statute. See
Letter from Bronson C. La Follette, Wisconsin Attorney General, to Walter Kunicki,
Chairperson, Special Comm'n on Bio-Ethics Legislative Council (Jan. 14, 1985).
No state or federal court has yet addressed the issue of whether pregnancy clauses can
withstand constitutional scrutiny. While the Supreme Court of Washington was directly
confronted with this issue in DiNino v. State, 684 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1984), it chose not to
address it. In that case, Ms. DiNino had prepared a living will stating that it was to be given
effect even if she was pregnant. Ms. DiNino requested that the court resolve the constitu-
tionality of the pregnancy clause in the statute so that she and her doctor could know what
their rights and liabilities were under the Washington Natural Death Act. Id. at 1300.
However, the court refused to address the issue, ruling that a nonjusticiable controversy
was presented. Id. Ms. DiNino was neither pregnant at the time she brought suit nor was
she suffering from a terminal condition. Thus, because the court thought that it would be
issuing an advisory opinion, it declined to address the issue raised. Id.
This result is unfortunate. As the dissent argued, the majority opinion "underrates the
public importance of this issue," and this is a "matter of 'continuing and substantial public
interest' that warrants an authoritative determination for future guidance." Id, at 1301
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makes it unclear exactly what the rights of an incompetent pregnant
woman are and whether she would be better off not having a prior
directive and relying upon the common law and the Constitution to
protect her right to bodily integrity and autonomy. This Comment
will show that pregnancy clauses, as presently written, create legal and
policy deficiencies that require the creation of a more caring para-
digm to resolve the issue of protecting the individual rights of the
incompetent pregnant woman.
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Comment argues that
pregnancy clauses in prior directive statutes violate the common law.
However, since legislatures can change the common law, this paper
looks to the federal Constitution to defend the rights at issue from
arbitrary state action. Part II argues that pregnancy clauses in prior
directive statutes also violate constitutional rights of autonomy and
privacy under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as violate Ninth and Thirteenth
Amendment prohibitions on state power over the individual. Part III
argues that pregnancy clauses in prior directive statutes are also defi-
cient from a policy standpoint and that there is a more realistic and
humane way to legislate. Part III concludes by proposing a legislative
remedy that avoids constitutional, common law, and policy deficien-
cies in dealing with an incompetent pregnant woman with, or with-
out,5" a prior directive.
Finally, this Comment concludes that the best way to deal with
the dilemma of whether life-sustaining treatment shourd be with-
drawn or withheld from an incompetent pregnant woman with a via-
ble fetus, or one who has a pre-viable fetus and has not made her
wishes clear in a prior directive, is to defer to the family or friends of
the individual and allow them to make the decision instead of al-
lowing the state to simply ordain what should occur. This solution, a
caring substituted judgment approach, will best effectuate the inter-
ests of the individual, the state, and family and friends, by recognizing
that individual decisions are rarely made in a vacuum and that we
often look to family and friends to resolve difficult moral and legal
issues in our life and as death approaches.
(Dimmick, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Since pregnancy only lasts nine months and
a terminally ill individual may not survive the pregnancy, or potential legal proceedings,
the court should have resolved this important issue, because it is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S.
498, 515 (1911).
51. While this Comment mainly addresses the situation where a prior directive has
been executed by an incompetent pregnant woman, the legislative proposal discussed infra
also addresses the situation where a prior directive does not exist.
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I. THE COMMON LAW AND PREGNANCY CLAUSES
The common law has long recognized and upheld the right of a
competent or incompetent individual to forego medical treatment.52
This right to forego medical treatment under the common-law is
based on the doctrine of informed consent,"3 which "also encom-
passes a right to informed refusal." 4 Many state courts that have ad-
dressed the issue of whether an individual has a right to forego
medical treatment have avoided the constitutional issues involved and
have decided these cases solely on common-law grounds.5 5 This has
been the case whether the individual in question was competent to
make such decisions or incompetent.56
52. See, e.g., Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body") (Cardozo, J.), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957); Pratt v. Davis, 118 I11. App. 161, 166 (1905), affd, 79 N.E. 562 (I11.
1906) ("Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's first and greatest right, which
underlies all others-the right of inviolability of his person; in other words the right to
himself-is the subject of universal acquiescence"); Slater v. Baker & Stapleton, 95 Eng.
Rep. 860 (KB. 1767) (holding surgeon liable for damages for not obtaining the consent of
his patient before operating); see also supra notes 3, 6 & 14.
53. The doctrine of informed consent "follows logically from the universally recog-
nized rule that a physician, treating a mentally competent adult under non-emergency
circumstances, cannot properly undertake to perform surgery or administer other therapy
without the prior consent of his patient." Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 438-39, 379 A.2d
1014, 1019 (1977). "The fountainhead of the doctrine... is the patient's right to exercise
control over his own body .... by deciding for himself whether or not to submit to the
particular therapy." Id. at 439, 379 A.2d at 1019.
In effect, the doctrine of informed consent protects two interests: "the interest in
being free from nonconsensual bodily invasion and the interest in decisionmaking auton-
omy." Martha A. Matthews, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse Lifesaving
Treatment, 75 CAL. L. REV. 707, 721 (1987). See also Edward A. Lyon, The Right to Die: An
Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 58 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1367 (1990).
54. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (N.J. 1985). See also Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277 (1990) ("[Tlhe common-law doctrine of informed consent is
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment."); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d 633, 635 (Mich. 1992) ("The logical corollary of
the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses the right not to
consent, that is, the right to refuse medical treatment and procedures").
55. See, e.g., Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); In re
Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky.
1993); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me.
1987); In re Rosebush, 491 N.W.2d at 635; In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); In re Storar,
420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). It is interesting to note that soon
after the issuance of the Mack decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Maryland
General Assembly stated in the Preamble to the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act of
1993 that the "constitutional law of this nation recognizes an individual's right to personal
health care decisionmaking, complementing the common-law doctrine of informed con-
sent." 1993 Md. Laws 372.
56. See, e.g., supra notes 6 & 14.
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While most prior directive statutes do not alter the common
law, 7 state legislatures have the power to alter or change the common
law, in conformity with constitutional restrictions on legislative power,
and restrict those rights that now exist if they so desire.5" Thus, to
defend the right to forego medical treatment, this Comment looks to
the federal Constitution.5
9
II. THE CONSTrrUTION AND PREGNANCY CLAUSES
A. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
1. Right to Bodily Integrity and Privacy.-Most analyses of the con-
stitutional right to forego medical treatment rely on the right of au-
tonomy,' better known as the right to privacy. The Supreme Court
first recognized this right in Griswold v. Connecticut.61
In Griswold the Court stated that there are various zones of pri-
vacy that are protected by the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, and
that without such zones of privacy those rights explicitly expressed
could not be truly enjoyed.62 The Court ruled that the state could not
forbid married couples from using contraceptives because the marital
relationship is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution6"
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 4 The
57. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.984(5) (Baldwin 1991) (The Kentucky Living
Will and Health Care Directive Acts "shall not impair or supersede any common law or
statutory right that an adult has to effect the withholding or withdrawing medical care");
1993 Md. Laws 372 (common-law rights not superseded by statute); Thomas W. Mayo,
Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die", 49 MD. L. REv. 103, 136-37 (1990) ("Natural Death Acts
and 'living will' statutes generally are regarded as having added rights to those that existed
at common law, not being in derogation of those pre-existing rights."); see aLso Jordan,
supra note 16, at 1152 ("The right to die was independently developed by the common law
courts, and the statutes generally contain a disclaimer that they are not intended to impair
or supersede any previously existing rights.").
58. See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 570 (1892) ("It is, of course, com-
petent for the legislature to change any doctrine of the common law"); United States v.
Thomas, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 337, 344 (1872) ("But the legislature can undoubtedly, at its
pleasure, change the common-law.").
59. This Comment recognizes that several state appellate courts have found a state-
based constitutional right to forego medical treatment. See supra note 12 and accompany-
ing text. However, this Comment looks to federal constitutional law to defend the right to
forego medical treatment, recognizing that states are free to find greater rights than exist
under the federal Constitution, but that the federal Constitution protects the minimum of
rights that all Americans will be entitled to exercise, regardless of what their particular
state constitution protects.
60. See, e.g., supra notes 12-13, 53, 57; infra notes 81, 97, 127.
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. 381 U.S. at 484.
63. Id. at 486.
64. The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part that: "nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
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Court held that the Connecticut law at issue deprived married persons
of the liberty protected by their fundamental right to be married and
to make decisions about whether or not to use birth control.6 5
Thus, the court will protect certain fundamental rights despite
the lack of specific language in the Constitution or Bill of Rights that
defines those rights.6" States cannot infringe upon these fundamental
rights that are protected by the penumbras of the Bill of Rights67 with-
out a compelling reason to do so.' Though there is no explicit basis
in the Constitution for the decision in Griswold, the opinion of the
Court was correct "in finding that the values of privacy, including free-
dom from government intrusion with private thoughts, association,
and liberty, had long been a part of American legal philosophy."69
The genesis of the right to privacy in American jurisprudence be-
gan with an article written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren in
1890.70 In that article, Brandeis and Warren posited that a general
right existed to be free from the intrusions of society in private affairs,
and, in particular, to be free from the intrusion of newspapers into
the life of the individual.7 ' From that article, the right to privacy has
developed along four main branches of constitutional analysis. These
four branches are: (1) the common law tort freedom from intrusion
by others into the personal property of an individual and from disclo-
sures of information about the individual's private affairs;72 (2)
Fourth Amendment privacy that protects the individual from unrea-
sonable governmental searches and seizures;7" (3) First Amendment
privacy in speech and association;" and (4) privacy under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which allows the individual to engage in certain highly personal activi-
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
65. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONsrrrTunoNAL LAw § 14.27, at 686 (3 ed. 1988).
66. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
67. 381 U.S. at 484; see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
69. NOWAK ET AL., supra note 65, at 687.
70. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890);
see also Ken Gormley, One-Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335.
71. Gormley, supra note 70, at 1348-51.
72. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 70; Gormley, supra note 70, at 1345 ("The 'right to
be let alone,' which Warren and Brandeis went on to introduce to American jurispru-
dence, was a basic tort notion.").
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
74. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939).
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ties without undue governmental intrusion, i.e. fundamental decision-
making privacy.
75
The right of an incompetent pregnant woman to have her prior
directive effectuated is based on the fundamental decision-making
right to privacy found in the Constitution. This privacy right is contro-
versial, however, because it has no explicit basis in the Constitution. 6
Griswold was the first case to recognize a fundamental decision-making
privacy right.77 The privacy right enunciated in Griswold was soon af-
ter reaffirmed in Eisenstadt v. Baird. a In Eisenstadt, the Court held
that unmarried couples, just as married couples, could not be barred
from the use of contraceptives because to do so violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 79
A year later, "[i]n the single most noteworthy and (simultane-
ously) notorious decision of the twentieth century, the Court ex-
tended its privacy logic in ... Roe v. Wade8 ° and created a species of
privacy unattached to specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, now
burrowed in the single word 'liberty' appearing in the Fourteenth
Amendment.""' Roe held that a state could not completely forbid a
woman from choosing to obtain an abortion because such state action
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well
as the right to privacy.82 As stated by Justice Blackmun, author of the
majority opinion, the right to privacy is "broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."83
75. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Gormley, supra note 70, at 1406 ("Certainly, Griswold, Roe and subsequent cases
involving fundamental decision making privacy do share a common theme relating to a
repulsion from governmental intrusion. That is, privacy protects the individual from an
ever 'normalizing' state. . . by preventing the government from imposing certain funda-
mental decisions upon the individual.").
76. Gormley, supra note 70, at 1391-92. Although a majority of the justices in Griswold
agreed that there is a fundamental right of privacy under the Constitution, the Court was
divided on the specific source. Id.
77. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
78. 405 U.S. 438, 455 (1972).
79. Id. at 446-55.
80. 410.U.S. 113 (1973).
81. Gormley, supra note 70, at 1392; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (The right to privacy is
"founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
upon state action."); Anita L. Allen, Feminist Moral, Social, and Legal Theoy: Taking Liberties:
Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theoy, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 461, 465 (1987)
("[P]rivacy refers to an aspect of liberty. It refers to freedom from governmental or other
outside interference with decisionmaking and conduct, especially respecting appropriate
private affairs.").
82. 410 U.S. at 164.
83. Id. at 153.
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The Roe Court recognized that there was no explicit basis in the
Constitution for the right of fundamental decision-making privacy,
but the Court reiterated that it has consistently recognized a right of
personal privacy and that personal rights that can be seen as 'funda-
mental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' 4 are included
within the zone of privacy protected by the Constitution. 5 The Court
stated, however, that these fundamental privacy rights are not abso-
lute.8 6 They will be balanced against relevant state interests 7 which
can override the individual interest if the state's interests are compel-
ling and the statute in question is narrowly drawn to express the legiti-
mate state interests.8 8 Roe has led to a long line of cases that have
further refined the parameters of the right of privacy and bodily integ-
rity while looking at the issue of abortion rights. These cases include
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,89 Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,9" Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,91 Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,92 Webster v. Reproduc-
tive Health Services," and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.9"
Although these cases dealt mainly with abortion rights, the princi-
ple that the right to privacy includes a right to bodily autonomy and
integrity was well established.95 As stated by the plurality in Casey I,
"Roe. . . may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as
a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily
integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on govern-
mental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection."96
While it has been argued that the right to autonomy and privacy does
84. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
85. Roe, 410 U.S at 152.
86. Id. at 154; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) ("Roe did not declare an
unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion.'").
87. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
88. Id. at 155.
89. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
90. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
91. 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron fl); 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (Akron 1).
92. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
93. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
94. Casey , 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
95. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (DouglasJ, concurring) (A fundamen-
tal aspect of privacy is the "freedom to care for one's health and person, [free] from bodily
restraint or compulsion"); see also Allen, supra note 81, at 474 ("Post-Roe cases have illumi-
nated the Court's understanding that the right of privacy is really an aspect of constitution-
ally protected liberty.").
96. 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
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not sustain the right to forego medical treatment,9 7 this view is in er-
ror. "It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in
Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to
interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood . . . as well as bodily integrity."98
Thus, the basic principles that can be gleaned from the Court's
decisions in this area are that certain realms of personal decision-mak-
ing fall under a right of privacy and bodily integrity which restricts the
state from infringing upon those decisions unless there is a compel-
ling state interest to do so and the statute is narrowly drawn to effectu-
ate those compelling state interests.99 These protected areas include
decisions regarding contraception, 10 marriage,' 0 ' procreation,10 2
child rearing and education, 103 family relationships,0 4 and bodily
integrity.10 5
Under the Griswold-Roe line of cases, an incompetent pregnant
woman's decision to forego life sustaining treatment may also be pro-
tected by the right of privacy and liberty.10 6 A woman's decision to
execute a prior directive, and to have it effectuated, implicates her
fundamental right to make decisions regarding procreation, family re-
lationships, and bodily integrity. Because these matters involve "the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
97. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, The Due Process "Right To Life" in Cruzan and
its Impact on "Right-To-Die" Law, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 193 (1991); Mayo, supra note 57; Lyon,
supra note 53.
98. Casey I, 112 S. Ct. at 2806.
99. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
101. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
102. See, e.g., Casey 1, 112 S. Ct. 2791; Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942).
103. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
104. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
105. See, e.g., Casey I, 112 S. Ct. 2791; Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261. In Cruzan, the Court did not
address whether a person could refuse medical treatment based on a right to privacy be-
cause the Court assumed that the Constitution included a "liberty" interest sufficient to do
so. Id. at 278-79 n.7. Further, "the concept of privacy embodies the moral fact that a
person belongs to himself and not others nor society as a whole." Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at
777-78 (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. See generally Janice MacAvoy-Snitzer, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1280, 1287 (1987) ("Although Roe and its progeny have examined the right
of privacy in terminating pregnancy in the context of anti-abortion legislation, it does not
follow that Roe protects a woman's right of privacy only when she seeks to have an abortion.
Roe addressed a broad right of privacy.").
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choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,"10 7 they are central
to the "liberty" interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, an incompetent pregnant woman has the "right to de-
fine [her] own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life," and those concepts should not be
"formed under compulsion of the State."' As this right extends to
competent individuals, so it must extend to incompetent individuals
in order to maintain and respect their constitutional rights.'0 9
Although the interests of an incompetent pregnant woman are
not absolute and must be balanced against the interests of the state, l"0
those state interests do not become compelling until the fetus is via-
ble. 11 Therefore, pregnancy clauses in statutes that do not allow the
prior directive of an incompetent pregnant woman to be effectuated
even before viability must be struck down as an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the right to privacy and bodily integrity, which is "broad
enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treat-
ment,""' 2 and which is an "ultimate exercise""' of that constitutional
right.
a. Pregnancy Clauses Before Fetal Viability. -Before the point
of fetal viability, the state's interest in the fetal life or the health of the
107. Casey 1, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
108. Id. at 2807. The reasoning of Casey Ihas most recently been relied upon to support
the right of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to commit physician-assisted sui-
cide. Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 5831 (W.D. Wa. 1994). In
that case, the district court judge concluded "that the suffering of a terminally ill person
cannot be deemed any less intimate or personal, or any less deserving of protection from
unwarranted governmental interference, than that of a pregnant woman." Id. at 1460. It is
a short logical step to conclude that an incompetent pregnant woman should have the
right to have her prior directive, which was created when she was competent, carried out.
As the court went on to note, "[tihe liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the freedom to make choices according to one's individual conscience about those
matters which are essential to personal autonomy and basic human dignity." Id. at 1459.
109. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 428 ("To protect the incompetent person within its
power, the State must recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford that
person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent persons."); see
also In re Eichner, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 542-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), modified, In re Storar, 420
N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
110. See supra notes 7, 86-88 and accompanying text.
111. "Viability means that the fetus's condition is such that it can survive after birth with
help from neonatal intensive care resources." Mary Mahowald, Beyond Abortion: Refusal of
Cesarean Section, 3 BioETHics 106, 110 (1989). The point of fetal viability is generally
thought to be 28 weeks of gestation. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160. While it is recognized that
viability may occur as early as 24 weeks of gestation, id. at 160 n.60, it is assumed for argu-
ment that 28 weeks is the point of viability.
112. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (NJ. 1976).
113. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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incompetent pregnant woman can never be compelling enough to
override her privacy and bodily integrity interests. 114 Although the
Casey I plurality has rejected the trimester framework established in
Roe, the basic holding of Roe still stands.' 15 As stated by the plurality in
Casey I, "a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ulti-
mate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability."" 6 By
analogy, a state may not stop an incompetent pregnant woman from
rejecting life-sustaining procedures before her fetus is viable.
There can be no doubt that, just as a prior directive statute with a
pregnancy clause denying enforcement of a directive in the case of an
incompetent woman with a pre-viable fetus is an "undue burden"" 7
on her right to abortion, it is an "undue burden" on her right to
forego medical treatment.""
b. Pregnancy Clauses After Fetal Viability.-Although a state
cannot interfere with an incompetent pregnant woman's decision to
forego life-sustaining treatment before her fetus is viable, the state's
interest in fetal life does become compelling at the point of fetal via-
bility."l 9 At that point, the state may forbid an abortion from occur-
ring ' unless the health of the mother is in danger. 12' However, in
114. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
115. 112 S. Ct. at 2818, 2821.
116. Id. at 2821.
117. See id. at 2820 ("A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid
.... [A] n undue burden is an unconstitutional burden."). For the developing interpreta-
tion of what an 'undue burden' encompasses, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S.
Ct. 909, 910-11 (1994) (Casey fl) (Souter, J.) (noting that the Third Circuit's construction
of the Supreme Court's decision in Casey 1, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), as only requiring a
plaintiff to show that an abortion regulation would be an 'undue burden' "in a large frac-
tion of the cases" as correct); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1669
(1993) (O'Connor, J.) (noting that laws restricting abortion are an 'undue burden' if, "in a
large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, [they] will operate as a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion.").
118. See generally Casey I, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21. The genesis and development of the
"undue burden" test can be seen by reviewing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458-59
(1990) (O'ConnorJ, concurring in part & concurring in judgment in part); Akron II, 497
U.S. 502 (1990); Webster, 492 U.S. at 530 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in
judgment); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Simopoulos v. Virginia,
462 U.S. 506, 520 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 505 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment in part & dissenting in part); Akron I, 462 U.S. at 464 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti 1); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 198
(1973).
119. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. See also Casey I, 112 S. Ct. at 2821.
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979).
121. Casey 1, 112 S. Ct. at 2821; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
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the case of an incompetent pregnant woman whose prior directive is
at issue, this last point is moot because there is no health of the
mother to protect. Thus, at the point of fetal viability, just as a state
could forbid an abortion from occurring, it seems likely that a state
would be allowed to forbid a prior directive from being carried out
that would end the incompetent pregnant woman's life, and thus the
life of the fetus.
The argument can be made that the potential fetal life should
not be allowed to override the interests of the mother in bodily integ-
rity and personal autonomy, and such an argument apparently has
support in the language of certain state court appellate decisions.
Specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in In re Quinlan'22
that "the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prog-
nosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's
rights overcome the State interest. "123
There is little doubt that keeping an incompetent woman alive
against her will is an invasive procedure when her prognosis is dim. In
such a case, it is likely that a court would uphold her right to forego
medical treatment. Where a viable fetal life is involved, 124 however,
the individual rights of the mother will likely be seen as not overcom-
ing the state interest in the fetal life. Quinlan did not address a situa-
tion in which an incompetent woman was pregnant, so it is unlikely
that the case could be used to significantly bolster an argument that
fetal rights should not be able to overcome the right of the mother to
have her prior directive effectuated in light of Casey P25 and its
predecessors. 126
In re A. C., 27 however, did address a situation in which the incom-
petent woman was pregnant. The court stated that
in virtually all cases the decision of the patient, albeit dis-
cerned through the mechanism of substituted judgment, will
control. We do not quite foreclose the possibility that a con-
flicting state interest may be so compelling that the patient's
wishes must yield, but we anticipate that such cases will be
extremely rare and truly exceptional.128
122. 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
123. Id. at 663 (emphasis in original).
124. See Casey I, 112 S. Ct. at 2821; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
125. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
126. See, e.g., supra notes 80, 89-93.
127. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).
128. Id. at 1252 (citations omitted).
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The court held that the ordering of a cesarean section against the
wishes of the mother was improper, even though such a procedure
seemed necessary to save the life of the fetus.' 29 The court failed to
explain "in what circumstances ... the state's interests can ever prevail
over the interests of a pregnant patient."'3 0 This is a strong statement
in support of the woman's interest in protecting her right to bodily
integrity either directly or through the doctrine of substituted judg-
ment.13 1 However, as pointed out by the partially dissenting opinion,
the statements of the majority are dictum and seem to go further than
what is seen under present federal case law.1 32 "The state's interest in
preserving human life and the viable unborn child's interest in sur-
vival are entitled, I think, to more weight than I find them assigned by
the majority when it states that 'in virtually all cases the decision of the
patient ... will control.'"' Federal case law has made it clear that
"the state's interest in potential human life becomes compelling at the
point of viability" 34 and that even before viability there is "an impor-
tant and legitimate state interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life."135
Some courts have recognized that a viable fetus born live may
have a cause of action for prenatal injury.' 6 From this principle,
many state courts have applied a balancing test in cases of "maternal-
fetal conflict" 37 involving a viable fetus. This test weighs the interests
of the fetus and the state against the mother's interest in bodily integ-
rity and autonomy. 3 1 In such circumstances, though rare, most
courts have found that the state's interest in protecting the unborn
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
132. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1254 (Belson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id.
134. Id,; see also supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
135. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. See also Casey I, 112 S. Ct. at 2849 ("[A]s the fetus evolves into
its postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the uterine environment, the State's
interest in the fetus' potential human life, and in fostering a regard for human life in
general, becomes compelling.") (Blacknun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (holding that a viable
fetus, later born, may have a cause of action for injuries sustained while in the womb); see
also Patricia King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn,
77 MICH. L. REv. 1647, 1657-59 (1979) ("[T]he live birth criterion [is] important not as a
sign of physical separation, which could occur at any time during the gestational period,
but as verification of a capacity for continued life.").
137. This term is not altogether accurate, as often the conflict is between the wishes of
the woman and the wishes of the health care provider and/or state as to what course of
medical treatment should be followed.
138. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga.
1981). In Jefferson, the court weighed the interest of the mother in protecting her individ-
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child is compelling and should prevail over the interests of the
mother.1
3 9
Thus, while the argument exists that the fetal (and state) interest
in life should not override the maternal interest in individual liberty
and bodily integrity, it appears that after viability the state's interest in
the fetal life will generally be seen as compelling and that the state
interest will be recognized by most federal and state courts and en-
forced over the wishes of the mother in protecting her individual
rights."4 This legal principle does not mean, however, that the right
ual right to practice her religious beliefs against the interest of the unborn child's right to
life and found in favor of the child's right to life. Id. at 460.
139. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Wo-
men's Liberty, 43 HI-ASNGS L.J. 569, 571 (1992) ("[C]ourts in eleven states have ordered
pregnant women to submit to cesarean sections against their will. In at least one such case,
the compelled surgery required physically tying the woman to the operating table.") (cita-
tions omitted); William J. Curren, Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections ReceiveJudicial Defeat, 323
NEw ENG. J. MED. 489 (1990) ("In a quiet, often unnoticed, but consistent manner, a
number of trial-court judges in at least 11 states across the country have ordered that a
pregnant woman must submit to a cesarean section to deliver a viable fetus against the
known and clearly expressed will of the woman."); Veronica E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered
Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1987) (Judges granted petitions
to order cesarean sections in 13 out of 15 cases).
140. See, e.g., In rejamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering a
blood transfusion over the religious objections of the mother to protect the life of a mid-
term fetus); Crouse Irving Mem. Hosp. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985);
Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (court-or-
dered cesarean section over wishes of mother); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623
(1973) ("right of privacy includes a right to die with which the State should not interfere
where there are no minor or unborn children ... ."). Nevertheless, it must be noted that
In re A.C., supra notes 127-135 and accompanying text, and the recent case of Mother Doe,
supra, may signal a new trend by the courts to recognize and uphold the rights of the
individual pregnant woman to personal autonomy and bodily integrity over the interest of
the State in potential fetal life.
Mother Doe, later identified as Tabita Bricci, a 22-year-old Chicago woman, was 37
weeks pregnant and suffered from a medical condition in which the placenta was "not
delivering sufficient oxygen to the viable unborn fetus." Emergency Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Baby Bay Doe v. MotherDoe (No. A-
502) (hereinafter "Emergency Petition"), at 3-4, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 652 (1993). On
December 9, 1993, the State filed a Petition for Adjudication of Wardship in the Cook
County Juvenile Court, alleging that the unborn fetus was neglected because Ms. Bricci
refused to submit to a cesarean section. Id. The juvenile court declined to rule, holding
that it lacked jurisdiction under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. Id.
On December 10, 1993, an emergency hearing was held before the Illinois Appellate
Court, Third Division. Id. at 5. The court ruled that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction
to rule on the original Petition, but that the case could go forward in the circuit court
under its equity powers. Id. On that same date, the State filed a new petition in the circuit
court requesting that "the court ... approve a temporary custodian solely to consent to the
performance of a cesarean section." Id. At the hearing before the circuit court, a doctor
"testified that if a cesarean section [was] not performed, the unborn fetus [had] a close to
zero percent chance of surviving the natural birth process through the vaginal canal." Id.
The doctor testified that he believed that brain damage had already occurred. Id. at 6.
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to privacy of the individual and her right to bodily integrity may be
trampled in order to serve the state's interest. Simply allowing the
state at the point of fetal viability to dictate what shall be done with an
incompetent pregnant woman's body is violative of basic societal,
moral, and philosophical beliefs and would equate an incompetent
pregnant woman with an incubator or reproductive vessel.'
41
Judge Brownfield, in his ruling on December 11, 1993, found that Ms. Bricci refused
to submit to a cesarean section based on her religious beliefs and that failure to have the
cesarean section posed serious risks to the unborn child. Id. at 6. Nevertheless, he refused
to grant the State's request for a temporary custodian to consent to the cesarian section.
Id. On December 14, 1993, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second Division, unanimously
affirmed the lower court ruling without written opinion. Id. On December 16, 1993, the
Illinois Supreme Court denied the Public Guardian's Emergency Petition for Leave to Ap-
peal. Id. at 7. On December 18, 1993, the United States Supreme Court denied the Public
Guardian's Emergency Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe, 114
S. Ct. 652 (1993).
The Public Guardian argued in its Emergency Petition to the Supreme Court that the
State had a compelling interest in protecting the life of a viable unborn fetus and that the
case should be remanded back to the lower courts to weigh that State interest against the
interest of the mother to practice her religion freely and to make decisions concerning her
medical care. Emergency Petition at 13. As already stated, the Court declined to hear the
case.
However, on April 5, 1994, the Illinois Appellate Court issued a written opinion in this
case "[c]ognizant of the seriousness of the question presented, and believing that the [ ]
courts of Illinois require some guidance in this area .... " Baby Boy Doe v. Mother Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The court held that "a woman's competent choice in
refusing a medical treatment as invasive as a cesarean section during her pregnancy must
be honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be harmful to her fetus." Id. at
330.
Relying on federal and state court precedent, the court found that the right of a com-
petent pregnant woman to forego such medical treatment arose from "her rights to pri-
vacy, bodily integrity, and religious liberty...." Id. at 332. The court went on to state that
"[t]he potential impact upon the fetus is not legally relevant; to the contrary, [the Illinois
Supreme Court] explicitly rejected the view that the woman's rights can be subordinated
to fetal rights." Id. (citing 531 N.E.2d at 355). Thus, when such an invasive procedure as a
cesarean section is at issue, the state cannot trump the rights of the pregnant woman and
cannot compel her "to do or not do anything merely for the benefit of the unborn child."
Id.
Baby Boy Doe was delivered by a successful natural birth in December 1993. Tracy
Shryer, Woman at Center of ispute Gives Birth, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1993, at A24. Physicians
said it would be six months before they would be able to determine if he suffered any brain
damage while in utero. Id.
141. See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 613 (1986) ("By substituting
its judgment for that of the woman, the state deprives women of their right to control their
lives during pregnancy-a right to liberty and privacy protected by the Constitution. Fur-
thermore, by regulating women as if their lives were defined solely by their reproductive
capacity, the state perpetuates a system of sex discrimination that is based on the biological
difference between the sexes, thus depriving women of their constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.").
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2. Equal Protection Analysis.-Under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, similarly situated people must be
treated similarly and any sex-based classification "must serve ,impor-
tant governmental objectives and be substantially related to those
objectives to pass scrutiny by constitutional measures." 42 Pregnancy
clauses in prior directive statutes do not meet this standard before the
incompetent woman's fetus is viable. Before viability-before the
state's interest in fetal life becomes compelling143 -pregnancy clauses
create classifications which on their face are not necessary to the
achievement of an important state interest' 14 and they do not treat
similarly situated people similarly.' 45
Pregnancy clauses in prior directive statutes violate the equal pro-
tection clause because they classify women on the basis of whether
they are pregnant and competent, or incompetent. Conversely, they
classify women based upon whether they are incompetent and preg-
nant, or not pregnant. If a woman is competent and pregnant, she
may choose to have life support withdrawn or to have an abortion with
little restriction on her rights, as set forth by the Court in its abortion
rights cases.1 46 However, if the woman is incompetent and pregnant,
her rights are stripped away by pregnancy clauses because they do not
allow her to end her life-sustaining treatment. The Equal Protection
Clause is violated because there is no legitimate state interest in deny-
ing an incompetent pregnant woman the same rights that it allows
competent pregnant women to exercise, i.e., the right to natural
death. When a prior directive document is executed, the woman is
competent; thus, competent women are also treated differently based
upon whether they are pregnant. Such "outright refusal to administer
the right of natural death to a pregnant woman because she is incom-
petent amounts to impounding her body and using it as an
incubator." 47
A variation of the first classification arises from pregnancy clauses
in prior directive statutes that distinguish between whether an incom-
petent woman is pregnant or not. If a woman is not pregnant and
incompetent, her prior directive will be effectuated in most states; but,
once it is determined that an incompetent woman is pregnant, her
142. Andrea M. Sharrin, Potential Fathers and Abortion: A Woman's Womb is Not a Man's
Castle, 55 BRooKLYN L. REv. 1359, 1398 (1990); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204
(1976).
143. See supra notes 116, 119 and accompanying text.
144. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
145. Sharrin, supra note 142.
146. See supra notes 80, 89-94.
147. Jordan, supra note 16, at 1159.
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right to have a prior directive effectuated disappears in most states.' 48
Again, there is no compelling state reason for such a statutory provi-
sion before the point of fetal viability. While the Supreme Court has
held that a state may classify on the basis of whether or not an individ-
ual is pregnant, a state may not do so unless the classification is ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest. 149 Such is not the case here
because before fetal viability the state can have neither a legitimate
nor a compelling interest in fetal life that overrides the individual's
right to bodily integrity.'50 Before the point of fetal viability occurs,
pregnancy clauses in prior directive statutes violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they "den [y] wo-
men the equal right of choice to act as equal participants in all of life's
activities,"151 either between men and women or among women
themselves.
B. Ninth Amendment Analysis
The Ninth Amendment 5 ' was largely ignored by the Court in its
protection of individual rights for the first two-hundred years of its
existence. 5 ' This changed, however, with the concurring opinion of
Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut.'"4 In his concurrence, Jus-
tice Goldberg argued that the right to privacy in marriage was a funda-
mental right protected from state infringement under the Ninth
Amendment.'5 5 Without a compelling state interest as well as a nar-
148. See supra notes 26-28, 30-31, 33-35, 37, 39, 41, 46-47 and accompanying text.
149. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig involved a California statute that
did not pay benefits to women for normal pregnancy-related conditions as a disability cov-
ered by the statute, although it did cover certain male-specific conditions such as prostatec-
tomies, circumcision, hemophilia and gout. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
Geduldig, the Court stated "that pregnancy-related restrictions are not first-order sex-based
equal protection problems because they are based on a real physical difference between
men and women." Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive
Health Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DuKE L.J. 324, 358. Such pregnancy clauses,
however, do more than discriminate upon a sex-based, real physical difference; they also
discriminate between women based upon whether or not they are competent.
150. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
151. Sharrin, supra note 142, at 1402.
152. The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
153. Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth Amendment, 59 FoRDntAM L. REv. 597 (1991). For a
good overview of Ninth Amendment scholarship, see Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth
Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENrr L. REV. 37 (1988).
154. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
155. Id. at 496.
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rowly drawn statute to effectuate that interest, such fundamental
rights may not be infringed.'56
A Ninth Amendment analysis of pregnancy clauses in prior direc-
tive statutes would conclude that they violate an incompetent preg-
nant woman's right to forego medical treatment because they forbid
her from exercising a liberty that is "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." 57 Before
1950, people generally died in the home and the state played little, if
any, role in decisions to forego medical treatment.158 Thus, the tradi-
tion of our nation is that people died at home where they made their
own decisions whether to undergo medical treatment.1 59 With the re-
cent advent of medical technology and the ubiquitous rise of hospitals
the focus of decision-making has changed."6 There is, however, no
reason to ignore the individual's traditional right to decide whether to
forego medical treatment.
Although the right to forego medical treatment is not explicitly
stated in the Constitution, "[t]he language and history of the Ninth
Amendment reveal that the framers of the Constitution believed that
there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmen-
tal infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights spe-
cifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."' 6 '
The founding fathers believed that fundamental rights that exist
outside those specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights should not
be deemed unprotected simply because they are not enumerated.1 62
Just as marriage is a fundamental right protected by the Ninth
Amendment, 16 so too is the fundamental right to privacy and bodily
integrity and the right to forego medical treatment.' These rights
156. Id. at 497.
157. Id. at 487 (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1923)).
158. HENRY R. GLICK, THE RIGHT TO DIE: POLICY INNOVATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 13
(1992).
159. Id.
160. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 17-18; see also Linda C. Fentiman, Privacy
& Personhood Revisited: A New Framework for Substitute Decisionmakingfor the Incompetent, Incur-
ably Ill Adult, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 801, 802-04 (1989) (noting that more than 80% of
Americans over the age of 65 die in an institutional setting).
161. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
162. Wachtler, supra note 153, at 599 ("[T]he founders believed that the people were
the source of all legitimate political authority and possessed fundamental personal liberties
that had their origin in the laws of nature."); see also Gormley, supra note 70, at 1411
(entering into the social contract did not "obliterate the liberty and personal autonomy of
the individual").
163. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
164. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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cannot be infringed upon without a compelling state interest to do
SO.1
6 5
Dying at home without interference from the state is 'deeply
rooted' in our society.' 66 Our founding fathers "recognized the signif-
icance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect,"
and protected individuals by enacting the Ninth Amendment, which
confers upon them, "as against the government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men." 6 7
As marital relations fall within the "private realm of family life,"'
so does the personal decision to forego medical treatment. As this
right is fundamental, as it is protected by the Ninth Amendment,169 it
cannot be abridged except for a compelling state interest, which can-
not arise before the point of fetal viability.1 7
0
C. Thirteenth Amendment Analysis
Pregnancy clauses in prior directive statutes are also unconstitu-
tional under the Thirteenth Amendment 171 because they reduce an
incompetent pregnant woman to a state of slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude. An incompetent pregnant woman who is kept alive without
her consent by attachment to life-support systems becomes nothing
more than a machine-an incubator or reproductive vessel for the
potential life that she is carrying-in order to serve the state.
It is clear, however, that the Thirteenth Amendment is an "abso-
lute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist" in
the United States. 172 By turning an incompetent pregnant woman
165. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
166. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105.
167. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that every unjustified
intrusion upon the privacy of an individual by the government violates the Constitution).
168. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
169. Although it is recognized that there is much debate over the Ninth Amendment
and the scope of its power and usage by the judiciary, it cannot be ignored or considered
surplusage to the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
"To treat the Ninth Amendment as an historical anomaly that adds nothing to serious
constitutional jurisprudence... not only violates the mandate that unenumerated rights
be neither denied nor disparaged, but also ignores the framer's intent that the Constitu-
tion be read broadly to protect fundamental rights." Wachtler, supra note 153, at 609.
170. See supra notes 114-116, 150 and accompanying text.
171. The Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1.
172. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
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into an unwilling incubator or reproductive vessel, she is reduced to
slavery in order to serve the state. Her body is completely controlled
by the state and she is not allowed to carry out her individual choice as
to what should be done with, or to, her body. This recalls aspects of
slavery as they existed when the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted.
Just as the African American woman's body was controlled by her
master in all respects including reproduction, so is the body of an
incompetent pregnant woman controlled by its new master-the
state. This nation's "leading Thirteenth Amendment cases" make it
clear "that no person may be compelled to serve another."173
Such reproductive slavery is especially offensive in light of the
Supreme Court's consistent holding that under the Thirteenth
Amendment states and individuals cannot require another individual
to labor for them in order to discharge their debts. 174 If peonage is
considered a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thir-
teenth Amendment, then a state order to remain attached to medical
machines and produce a child must also be considered a form of in-
voluntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.
"[T]he phrase 'involuntary servitude' was intended to extend to
cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in
practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results."' 75
And while it is easier to understand the "general spirit" of the phrase
involuntary servitude than to exactly define the phrase, 76 it is clear
that impounding the body of an incompetent pregnant woman would
fit within the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment. Forced la-
173. Andrew Koppelman, Legal Theoy: Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480, 485 (1990).
174. See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) (expressing concern over the
possibility that a bankruptcy debtor would be forced to work for creditors in violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) (stating that the Thir-
teenth Amendment's purpose was not only to end slavery, but to ensure a system of free
and voluntary labor); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942) (noting that coerced labor
is a form of involuntary servitude within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment);
United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146 (1914) ("compulsion of such service by con-
stant fear of imprisonment under the criminal laws" violates the Thirteenth Amendment);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905)
(holding that peonage, coercing the victim by threat of legal sanction to work off debt to a
master, is involuntary servitude).
175. Steirer v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 989, 998 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 85 (1993) (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)); see also Butler
v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916). Although the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted in
reaction to the enslavement of African Americans, it is not limited simply on the basis of
race. The Amendment prohibits all slavery or involuntary servitude except that concern-
ing criminal punishment. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873).
176. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942.
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bor through physical or legal coercion has always been barred by the
Thirteenth Amendment. 177 That prohibition has been reenforced by
recent courts' examination and condemnation of forced labor camps
and forced confinement.1 71 "[T]he critical factor in every case find-
ing involuntary servitude is that the victim's only choice is between
performing the labor on the one hand and physical and/or legal sanc-
tions on the other."
179
The logic of these cases extends to the situation where an incom-
petent pregnant woman is being forced to 'labor" 80 for the state
against her will. She has no choice because the state has pre-ordained
that choice for her through legal sanctions and the physical appropri-
ation of her body. Although the government "may require individuals
to perform certain well-established 'civic duties,' such as military ser-
vice and jury duty,"' such is not the case here. It can hardly be ar-
gued that procreating for the state is a well established civic duty in
light of Roe and its progeny. Further, "the nation does not seem to be
in danger of becoming depopulated unless women are compelled to
bear children." 82
Treatment of an incompetent pregnant woman so that she be-
comes nothing more than an incubator or reproductive vessel is anti-
thetical to our Constitution,8 " "akin to African slavery,"184 and cannot
177. Id. at 943; see also supra note 174 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939-53 (1988) (holding that in-
voluntary servitude exists when victim is forced to work under threat of physical restraint or
physical injury or by use of legal threats); United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1280-82 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894 (1988) (holding that defendant's repeated use of threats to
use physical force to make victims perform labor constitutes involuntary servitude and vio-
lates the Thirteenth Amendment); United States v. Booker, 655 F.2d 562, 564 (4th Cir.
1981) (concluding that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to end not only formal
slavery as it had existed in the South prior to the Civil War, but all types of involuntary
servitude); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting the purpose of the
Thirteenth Amendment was to proscribe conditions of enforced compulsory service of one
to another).
179. Steirer, 987 F.2d at 999; see also Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 943 (finding involuntary servi-
tude existed because victim had no choice but to work or face legal sanction).
180. "The pun on the word 'labor' should not distract attention from the fact that when
a woman is forced against her will to carry a child to term, control over her body and its
(re)productive capacities is seized from her and directed to a purpose not her own." Kop-
pelman, supra note 173, at 489.
181. Steirer, 987 F.2d at 999; see also Selective Draft Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 368-73 (1918)
(holding that a military draft does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment).
182. Koppelman, supra note 173, at 519.
183. Marcus Brown Bldg. Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 199 (1921) ("[T]he traditions of
our law are opposed to compelling a man to perform strictly personal services against his
will.").
184. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942.
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be sanctioned by society. The legislative proposal below precludes
such an undesirable result.
III. POLICY DEFICIENCIES OF PREGNANCY CLAUSES IN PRIOR DIRECTIVE
STATUTES AND A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
As discussed in Parts I and II above, pregnancy clauses in prior
directive statutes violate both common law and constitutional rights of
an incompetent pregnant woman, especially before the fetus is via-
ble.'" 5 Even after fetal viability, however, there are some serious ques-
tions as to whether it is wise to allow the state to command what will
be done with an incompetent pregnant woman's body. Arguments
about individual autonomy or state interests are not enough in this
situation, and in fact serve an injustice to those involved. This Com-
ment will propose a more humane approach to this problem after first
addressing the policy deficiencies of pregnancy clauses in prior direc-
tive statutes as they are currently written.
A. Policy Deficiencies of Pregnancy Clauses in Prior Directive Statutes
The first major policy deficiency of pregnancy clauses in prior
directive statutes is that they ignore the circumstances or wishes of the
incompetent pregnant woman. As stated in Part I, one goal of legisla-
tures in enacting prior directive statutes was to allow individuals to be
able to exercise their right to forego medical treatment and to avoid
being indefinitely hooked up to a machine against their will.' 86 This
concern evaporates, however, if the patient is incompetent and preg-
nant under most statutes as written because wishes and desires ex-
pressed in a prior directive will be ignored. 18 7
The second policy deficiency of pregnancy clauses in prior direc-
tive statutes is that they undermine the goals of the Patient Self-Deter-
mination Act (hereinafter PSDA). l  The PSDA was signed into law
approximately five months after the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Cruzan"'8 and "reflected an effort to ensure that the new constitu-
tionally protected right to 'self-determination in health care decisions'
be given force by ensuring that individuals were given an opportunity
to indicate their wishes with clear and convincing evidence."'90
185. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 26-28, 30-31, 33-35, 37, 39, 41, 46-47.
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (Supp. 1991).
189. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
190. Fred Cate, Implementing the Education Mandate of the Patient Seif-Detennination Act, 7
HEALTH LAW. 11 (Fall 1993). For a discussion of the legislative process and intent leading
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In effect, the PSDA requires hospitals that receive Medicare or
Medicaid funding to maintain written policies and procedures which
guarantee that every adult receiving care will be given written informa-
tion concerning patient involvement in treatment decision-making.
Hospitals must inform patients about the prior directive laws of the
state as well as the institution's policies respecting such documents. 19'
While the PSDA's intention to educate society and to foster com-
munication between physician and patient is laudable, its effectiveness
for the pregnant woman entering a maternity ward is questionable.
Essentially, a pregnant woman will be informed that she has the right
to create a prior directive, even though at least thirty-five jurisdictions
prohibit physicians from following this directive.192 The medical liter-
ature itself makes it clear, moreover, that a prior directive executed by
the pregnant woman would likely be ignored by her health care prov-
iders.19 3 Because of state law or health care provider reluctance to
abide by an executed prior directive,' pregnancy clauses undermine
the PSDA's public policy goals of fostering the communication be-
tween patient and physician that allows the patient to control what
occurs to her body.19
A third deficiency with pregnancy clauses in prior directive stat-
utes concerns conflicting requirements in the statutes 196 that make it
unclear exactly what rights an incompetent pregnant woman retains.
In states with integrated statutes, or a single statute, it is clear that a
pregnancy clause would control if there was a prior directive."' In
states with separate statutes, however, the conflicting provisions lead
to unclear law. A woman may be better off not having a prior direc-
tive at all in order to rely more effectively on her common-law and
to enactment of the PSDA, see Elizabeth McClosky, Between Isolation and Intrusion: The
Patient Self-Determination Act, 19 LAw, MED. & HEALTh CARE 80 (1991).
191. Cate, supra note 190, at 11; see also 57 Fed. Reg. 8194 (1992) (amending 42 C.F.R.
pts. 417, 431, 434, 483, 484, 489 and 498).
192. See supra notes 26-28, 30-31, 33-35, 37, 39, 41, 46, 47 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Mildred Solomon et al., Decision Near the End of Life: Professional Views on
Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 14 (1993); Lawrence Schneiderman, Ef-
fects of Offering Advance Directives on Medical Treatments and Costs, 117 ANN. ITE1RN. MED. 599
(1992); Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-Sustaining Care,
324 N. ENG. J. MED. 882 (1991).
194. See supra note 192.
195. See Cate, supra note 190, at 13 (noting the PSDA's focus on "opening discourse"
about a patient's right to choose medical treatment).
196. See supra notes 21-50 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rights.19 Again, such an outcome contradicts the
stated legislative policy goals for enacting such statutes. 199
A fourth policy deficiency exists in prior directive statutes with
pregnancy clauses because they completely ignore the "detriment that
the state would impose upon the pregnant woman" and her family "by
denying this choice altogether." °° Just as a woman may face many
hardships if denied the option to obtain an abortion and forced to
undergo an unwanted pregnancy, so too might she suffer if denied
the right to forego medical treatment. The incompetent pregnant
woman may not wish to leave behind a motherless child, nor make her
family suffer the hardship of witnessing her helpless incubation of the
fetus and of facing the child who will always remind them that the
mother was kept alive against her, and perhaps the family's, wishes. 20
1
The incompetent pregnant woman may also not want the family to
bear the financial and emotional burden of raising the child without
her participation. 2 2 "There is also the distress, for all concerned, as-
sociated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bring-
ing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise,
to care for it."20
3
These likely concerns of the incompetent pregnant woman are
totally ignored by the blind application of pregnancy clauses in prior
directive statutes. Again, these concerns have been ignored by the
legislatures, though their stated goal is to protect individual rights and
198. See supra notes 3749 and accompanying text. The question also arises whether
prior directive statutes limit the rights of those without prior directives. See, e.g., Cruzan,
760 S.W.2d at 420 (declining to rule on the question of whether the common law right to
refuse medical treatment was broader than the rights given under the Missouri Living Will
Act). This question, though relevant, exceeds the scope of this Comment.
199. Even in states without pregnancy clauses, prior directive statutes generally provide
no guidance to health care providers or individuals as to what should occur if the patient is
pregnant and incompetent. It is unclear whether the health care provider should follow
the patient's prior directive, the provider's own moral belief, or the request of the patient's
family. The incompetent pregnant woman's directive may be ignored because of the pro-
vider's fear of civil or criminal liability. The proposal below avoids ambiguity and gives
guidance to health care providers, individuals, and practitioners of law as to what should
occur in the situation where there is an incompetent pregnant woman both with, and
without, a prior directive.
200. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
201. See Elizabeth Benton, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes,
43 VAND. L. REv. 1821, 1826 (1990) (noting that the "risk of psychological harm to the
woman's partner and family must be considered when a pregnant woman's body is main-
tained against her express wishes").
202. See generally Benton, supra note 201, at 1826-27 (discussing the financial burdens
imposed on the woman's family when the state forces the birth of a child).
203. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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to promote individual and family decisionmaking. Pregnancy clauses
as presently written expressly thwart these goals.
As a society we must recognize and work to change laws that indis-
criminately deny half our population individual rights long protected
by common-law and the Constitution. This Comment proposes a rem-
edy to end such discrimination by incorporating the idea of the femi-
nist ethic of care with the legally recognized doctrine of substituted
judgment to create a pregnancy clause that recognizes and addresses
the interests of those parties responsible for an incompetent pregnant
woman with a prior directive.20 4
B. Feminist Ethic of Care
The struggle between the right of patient autonomy and bodily
integrity and the physician's (or the State's) paternal duty to help the
patient achieve the best outcome is well documented in bioethics liter-
ature. 2 5 This simple dichotomy, however, is inadequate to analyze
the real life circumstances and concerns of most individuals in our
society. Rarely does one make a decision without considering its ef-
fect upon family and friends. Seeing events as polar opposites, view-
ing the world in dichotomies, sets up a false dualism that lead us, as a
society, "to an either/or, self/other analysis instead of a plural, multi-
ple, variant, and contextualized analysis."
216
Feminist ethics20 7 looks beyond this narrow framework, and false
dualism, to consider how autonomy arises and flourishes in a larger
social context. An ethic of caring enhances autonomy.208 The law
must recognize that life decisions are made within a broad personal
context and that we cannot truly understand an individual's choices
204. As stated earlier, supra note 51, this proposal will also help protect the interests of
an incompetent pregnant woman who has not executed a prior directive, because it will
clarify the roles of the patient, health care provider, and surrogate decision-maker.
205. SUSAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS & HEALTH CARE 137 (1992)
(describing the struggle "as a clash between the basic moral principles of autonomy and
beneficence").
206. Bender, supra note 5, at 530.
207. Feminist ethics and feminism are "varied and multiple." Bender, supra note 5, at
519. This Comment recognizes that feminism is a label which encompasses more than a
.political struggle for woman's rights." Id. The Comment examines feminist theories
which emphasize "the need to value and focus on care, compassion, responsiveness, re-
sponsibility, conversation, and communication, as well as learning to listen closely to others
and to pay attention to others' needs, regardless of their differences from our own." Id.
See also NEL NODDtNGS, CAING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AM MORAL EDUCATION
24 (1984) ("Caring involves stepping out of one's own personal frame of reference into the
other's. When we care, we consider the other's point of view.").
208. See infra notes 214-215 and accompanying text.
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without understanding the larger circumstances of a person's life.2 1
The argument of individual autonomy or compelling state interest is
the argument of a general rule applied to a particular situation-an
ethic ofjustice-that often fails to look at the situation in context and
proceed to an equitable resolution within an ethic of care. 210 An ethic
of justice looks either to what the state must win in the situation or
what the individual must win and ignores not only the family, but
more importantly, the individual.
By not acknowledging or adopting an ethic of care, we not only
ignore the autonomy of the individual, but also the context of the
individual's life. "A care-based ethic arises out of perceptions of
human beings as relational, interdependent, and supportive as op-
posed to our current rights-based ethic in which people are separate,
autonomous, and equally empowered actors."211 An ethic of care rec-
ognizes that emotions and familial interaction play a large role in our
everyday life and in our decision-making. 21 2 The ethic of care ques-
tions, at the time of death, the attempt to separate individuals from
those who have been part of their lives and who have been a part of
their decision-making throughout life. Just as a model of friendship
and amicalism should be supported and fostered between patient and
physician, so too should it be promoted between patient and the state.
"Under amicalism, the intention would be to enlist friends and family,
who both understand and care personally and specifically for a pa-
tient, in the task of medical decision-making, rather than treating
medical choice as a contest between [an] isolated patient and [the]
physician"213 or state.
In the situation of an incompetent pregnant woman, it is not sim-
ply enough to advocate strict autonomy or compelling state interest,
209. Feminist ethics generally "reject[ ] the notion of an ethics founded on general
principles in favour of a context specific analysis." HELEN B. HOLMES & LAuRA M. PuRD,
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 24 (1992).
210. Holmes & Purdy, supra note 209, at 18; see also Leslie Bender, Teaching Feminist
Perspectives on Health Care Ethics and Law: A Review Essay, 61 U. CIN. L. Ray. 1251, 1259
(1993) (noting that an ethic ofjustice is generally seen as a rights-based model "in which
problems are analyzed using abstract principles organized in hierarchies by autonomous
decisionmakers," while an ethic of care, by comparison, is seen as "being more particular-
ized, contextual, relational, and interdependent, and rooted in values of caring and
responsibility").
211. Bender, supra note 5, at 535.
212. See generally AN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST & INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 71
(MaryJeanne Larrabee ed., 1993) ("[T]he justice orientation organizes moral perception
by highlighting issues of fairness, right, and obligation .... The care orientation mean-
while focuses on other saliencies: on the interconnections among the parties involved, on
their particular personalities, and on their weal and woe.").
213. Sherwin, supra note 205, at 157.
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there is another interest at stake: that of family and friends in protect-
ing the rights of an individual from being trampled by the state. The
interest of family and friends should be recognized and considered
before making the decision to attach or remove life-sustaining treat-
ment from an incompetent pregnant woman.
By adopting an ethic of care, we do not delegitimize or ignore the
autonomy and bodily integrity of the incompetent pregnant woman,
but rather strengthen it and give it added meaning. As Professor
Bender explains:
Autonomy, the power of an individual to control her own life
and death, is as much a cornerstone of a care-based ethic as
it is of modern medical ethics and legal practice. The differ-
ences are in the sources or meanings of autonomy. In a care-
based ethic, individual autonomy is a process nurtured in
webs of relationships and responsibilities instead of a static
condition pre-existing them. Whereas the ideological basis
of a rights-based ethic rests on an assumption of equally em-
powered, independent people, an ethic of care recognizes
that many relationships contain dependencies between dif-
ferently empowered people.... The autonomy of an ethic
of care can be melded with the autonomy concerns in a
rights-based medical ethic, if it is understood to mean self-
governing moral agency, rather than independent or self-
contained decisionmaking. Self-governing in an ethic of
care does not mean governing alone by abstract reasoning
and distant observations, but means choosing options with
respect to responsibilities, relationships, conversations, and
dialogues with others.214
By recognizing an ethic of care in decision-making, we further illumi-
nate the right of autonomy and recognize that the context of the situ-
ation is important to any decision. An ethic of care further effectuates
the autonomy and dignity of the individual,215 in this case the incom-
petent pregnant woman. This ethic is easily adapted to the legal sys-
tem and dovetails nicely with the doctrine of substituted judgment
which allows family and friends to take part in the decision about
whether medical treatment should be withheld or withdrawn from an
incompetent pregnant woman.
2 16
214. Bender, supra note 5, at 536-37.
215. Id. at 539.
216. See Fentiman, supra note 160, at 805 ("[S]ubstitute decision-making for an incom-
petent adult should seek to respect and promote that individual's right to autonomy and
privacy, both by seeking to effectuate his medical treatment choice, to the extent that it
can be determined once he is no longer competent, and by providing a sphere for private
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C. Substituted judgment
The substituted judgment doctrine arose under the common law
to provide a means by which the courts could deal with the incompe-
tent individual without a prior directive. As explained by the New
Jersey Supreme Court:
[u]nder the substituted judgment doctrine, where an incom-
petent's wishes are not clearly expressed, a surrogate deci-
sionmaker considers the patient's personal value system for
guidance. The surrogate considers the patient's prior state-
ments about and reactions to medical issues, and all facets of
the patient's personality that the surrogate is familiar with-
with, of course, particular reference to his or her relevant
philosophical, theological, and ethical values-in order to
extrapolate what course of medical treatment the patient
would choose.217
Although this Comment is particularly concerned with the situation in
which a prior directive exists, it is evident that a prior directive could
be discounted when a fetus is involved because the interests of the
state, the family, and friends are implicated. l' The choices expressed
in a prior directive are obviously precedent,219 and it is difficult to
decisionmaking by that individual, his family, and his physician, into which the state cannot
intrude") (emphasis added).
217. In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (N.J. 1987); see also Superintendent of Belchertown
State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977). The doctrine of substituted
judgment evolved from English estate law which called upon the court to 'don the mental
cap' of the person who was incompetent to look after an estate. See Ex Parte Whitbread in re
Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816).
218. The argument can be made that if a prior directive exists and the fetus is not viable,
the directive should be effectuated under all circumstances. While this may be an attrac-
tive argument initially in protecting the individual interest, reality counsels otherwise. It is
naive to think that a health care provider will effectuate a prior directive if an incompetent
woman is pregnant without discussing such action with the woman's family and friends.
The proposal below recognizes and attempts to address this reality.
219. One can argue that because the incompetent pregnant woman can not make a
contemporaneous choice whether or not to remain on life-sustaining treatment until the
fetus's birth, her precedent wishes, as evidenced by a prior directive, should not be fol-
lowed. This is especially true if the prior directive is unclear and does not address the
situation where a woman is incompetent and pregnant. The argument suggests that an
unclear prior directive could violate the present wishes of an incompetent pregnant wo-
man. The morally correct action in this situation is to look to family and close friends to
make such a decision. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal & Moral Reflec-
tions, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 857, 888 (1992) (arguing that "an advance choice has force, but not
the conclusive moral force of a contemporary choice").
It must be understood that upon completion of a prior directive, no one can reason-
ably contemplate all the possible situations in which it might be effectuated. Legislatures
generally do not expect such a level of specificity when a prior directive is executed be-
cause the purpose of having such statutes would be undermined. Again, however, the
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know whether the incompetent pregnant woman foresaw the event
occurring.
In such a situation it should be evident that a court or health care
provider may be reluctant to carry out a prior directive under the be-
lief that the incompetent pregnant woman's wishes are truly not
known in this situation. Moreover, "[m] any physicians are refusing to
discontinue life-sustaining medical treatment without judicial authori-
zation, due either to their own sense of professional ethics or to the
fear of civil or criminal liability."220 Under an ethic of care, family and
friends should decide the course of action in this difficult situation
rather than let the state step in and dictate what should occur. "Al-
most invariably the patient's family has an intimate understanding of
the patient's medical attitudes and general world view and therefore is
in the best position to know the motives and considerations that
would control the patient's medical decisions."2 21 While there is al-
ways the possibility that a woman may be left without either a family or
partner, this is an unlikely prospect. If it occurs, then close friends
should be given the same role that a family member or partner would
carry out in this situation.222 As stated by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, "our common human experience teaches us that family mem-
bers and close friends care most and best for a patient. They offer
love and support and concern, and have the best interest of the pa-
tient at heart. The importance of the family in medical treatment de-
cisions is axiomatic."2 Further, it is family and friends that treat a
"patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause."224
By combining the feminist ethic of care with the legally recog-
nized doctrine of substituted judgment (a 'caring substituted judg-
ment' approach), a better solution emerges to deal with the
incompetent pregnant woman who has executed a prior directive.
While a simple or decisive answer is difficult to achieve, the following
proposal, which incorporates a caring substituted-judgment approach,
situation where a woman is incompetent and pregnant is unusual because the fetus must
be considered. In order to insure that her wishes are respected, a woman would have to
specify in her prior directive what actions should take place if she is pregnant and incom-
petent. The proposal addresses this concern.
220. Fentiman, supra note 160, at 807.
221. In reJobes, 529 A.2d at 445.
222. There is no legitimate reason to cut off the individual from friends and family
when the individual is most in need of their assistance. Excluding family and friends from
medical decision-making should be the rare exception, not the rule. See In reJobes, 529
A.2d at 445 (noting that "family members are best qualified to make substitute judgments
for incompetent patients").
223. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 414 (N.J. 1987).
224. In reJobes, 529 A.2d at 445.
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should enable society to deal more humanely, compassionately, and
openly with the wishes of a dying incompetent pregnant woman.
D. Legislative Proposal
This Comment proposes that prior directive statutes be re-written
so that they take into account not only the common-law and constitu-
tional rights of the individual woman, but also the rights of family and
friends. Consideration of these rights will provide clearer guidance as
to what should occur if there is an incompetent pregnant woman with
(or without) a prior directive.
Pregnancy clauses in prior directive statutes must first address the
situation where the fetus is not yet viable. In that situation, the wishes
of the pregnant woman, as set forth in her prior directive, must be
effectuated if they are clearly stated. Until the point of viability, there
is simply no state interest that can overcome the interest of the incom-
petent pregnant woman to exercise her common-law and constitu-
tional rights to privacy and bodily integrity.225 In order to determine
what the wishes of the woman are, statutes should require that women
clearly state in their prior directive what is to occur if they become
incompetent while they are pregnant. 226 If the woman does so, then
her wishes must be effectuated before the fetus is viable. If she does
not make her wishes clearly known, then the decision whether to with-
draw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from an incompetent preg-
nant woman should go to family and friends, instead of to the health
care provider or the state.
Once fetal viability occurs, a look at strict individual autonomy
versus state interest reveals that most courts will likely rule that a state
has a compelling interest in fetal life and could prohibit life-sustaining
procedures from being withheld or withdrawn. 227 The state should
not, however, be allowed to mandate the outcome of this decision be-
cause the state will usually not suffer the consequences of its act. Fam-
ily and friends of the incompetent pregnant woman will suffer the
consequences and should be allowed to make the decision as to what
225. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
226. Several states' prior directive forms contain pregnancy clauses. Such forms require
that women initial them, cross them out, or specify what should be done if incompetent
and pregnant. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-603 (1994) ("If I am pregnant,
my decision concerning life-sustaining procedures shall be modified as follows ... ").
227. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
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should occur. Where there is no family, then close friends of the indi-
vidual should be consulted.228
This proposal would be similar to the Maryland Health Care Deci-
sions Act of 1993.229 Like the Maryland Act, it would designate surro-
gate decision-makers for an individual if they have not executed a
prior directive.230 All prior directive statutes should contain a section
worded substantially as follows:
Effect Of Directive During Pregnancy
(A) Before the fetus of an incompetent pregnant woman is
viable, 231 as defined in the definitional section of this Act, a
directive executed in accordance with this Act shall be given
effect if the woman has clearly stated her intent as to what
should be done in the event that she is pregnant at the time
of her incompetency23 2 and the fetus is not yet viable.
(1) If the woman has failed to indicate her intent as to
what should be done in the event that her fetus is not viable
and she is incompetent, then the mechanism set out in sub-
section (B) shall be followed. 3 3
228. This legislative proposal contains a priority system, which would ensure that even if
there are no family members available, or if the woman has not designated a surrogate
decision-maker, close friends would be consulted.
229. Mn. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 et seq. (1994).
230. Id. § 5-605.
231. As discussed earlier, viability is generally thought to occur at 28 weeks of gestation,
though it can occur as early as 23 or 24 weeks. Supra note 111. In this instance, the statute
should adopt bright-lines in order to be effective and give guidance to health care provid-
ers. In recognition of the fact that a legislature may not want to adopt such a bright-line
rule, the statute may allow the attending physicians to determine the point of viability.
This, too, could prove problematic. Concerns over possible liability on their part may
cause a health care provider to delay making a determination of viability long enough to
ensure fetal viability. In order to ensure uniformity in the Act's operation, it would be
more prudent for the legislature to establish 28 weeks as the point of viability.
232. Incompetency should be defined by the Act as it is presently done in prior directive
statutes, as discussed supra note 8.
233. This subsection recognizes that when a woman executes her prior directive she may
not be able to decide what she would like done in a situation where she is incompetent and
pregnant. It also recognizes that a woman may want her family to make this decision. In
addition, it is noted that health care providers are unlikely to follow an ambiguous prior
directive, particularly if the patient is incompetent and pregnant.
The argument could be made that this subsection incorrectly presumes that no choice
is made when a woman chooses not to say anything in her prior directive. In other words,
by not saying anything in the prior directive, the woman perhaps has made a choice that
her directive is not to be affected by the pregnancy and that it should be carried out. In
this situation where a woman is incompetent and pregnant, the better course is to require
her to make an explicit statement as to what she wants to occur. If a woman truly wants her
wishes to be effectuated, she needs to clearly state what they are. This requirement is
minimal in light of the fact that the alternative is that the state will make the decision for
her.
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(B) Once the fetus of an incompetent pregnant woman is
viable, as defined in the definitional section of this Act, the
health care providers should turn to the husband or partner,
family or close friends of the incompetent pregnant woman,
in order of priority established in subsection (C), to deter-
mine whether or not life-sustaining procedures should be
maintained or withheld or withdrawn. The decision of the
surrogate shall be given effect unless there is a conflict as
discussed in subsection (D).
(C) The following priority for surrogate decision-making is
established:
1. Guardian, if one has been appointed;
2. Surrogate or Proxy;
2134
3. The patient's husband or partner;23 5
4. An adult child of the patient;
5. A parent of the patient;
6. An adult brother or sister of the patient;
7. A friend or relative of the patient who is competent
and presents an affidavit stating that the person is a relative
or close friend of the patient and that they are familiar with
the patient's activities, health, and personal beliefs.
(D) If persons with equal decision-making priority under
subsection (C) of this section disagree as to what should be
decided as to life-sustaining procedures for the incompetent
pregnant woman, the case shall be referred to the institu-
tion's patient care advisory committee.23 6
(E) Standards for Surrogate Decision-makers are as follows:
(1) Any person authorized to make health care deci-
sions for an incompetent pregnant woman under this section
234. In most circumstances, it is likely that a family member would be named by the
individual as their guardian, or a surrogate or proxy. This, however, is not always the case.
Generally, the individual has the right, in a prior directive, to name a guardian, or a surro-
gate or proxy. If an individual is named, that person is given priority in this subsection.
However, if there is only a living will, a surrogate will not have been named. This hierarchy
would make it possible that family members or friends, instead of the state, would be the
individuals who would make the decision as to what should occur.
235. Use of the term partner recognizes that an incompetent pregnant woman may not
be married, or that she may be involved in a same-sex relationship.
236. A patient care advisory committee would try to resolve any dispute that develops
between co-equal surrogates. A physician acting in accordance with the recommendation
of the committee would be immune from liability. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.
§ 5-605(b) (1994) (providing that if surrogates disagree, the physician will refer the case to
the patient care advisory committee). For a complete discussion of patient care advisory
committees, see SymposiuM: HosPrrAL ETHics COMMrrTEES AND THE LAw, 50 Md. L. Rev.
742 (1991). For an example of a statute establishing patient care advisory committees and
requiring their use by health care facilities, see the Maryland Patient Care Advisory Com-
mittee Act. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-370 to -1705 (1990 & Supp. 1994).
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shall base those decisions on the wishes of the woman, recog-
nizing that any prior directive executed by her shall be given
great weight in the ultimate determination whether to with-
hold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
23 7
(2) In determining the wishes of the incompetent preg-
nant woman, a surrogate shall also consider her:
(a) current diagnosis and prognosis without the
treatment at issue, i.e. what effects will such treatment have
on the incompetent pregnant woman as well as the effects of
such treatment on the fetus;
2 38
(b) expressed preferences regarding the provision,
withholding, or withdrawal of specific treatment at issue or
of similar treatments;
(c) relevant religious and moral beliefs and per-
sonal values;
(d) behavior, attitudes, and past conduct with re-
spect to the treatment at issue and medical treatment
generally;
(e) reactions to the provision, withholding, or with-
drawal of a similar treatment for another individual; and,
(f) expressed concerns about the effect on the fam-
ily or intimate friends of the incompetent pregnant woman if
a treatment were provided, withheld, or withdrawn.
A policy such as that set out above will best effectuate all the interests
involved in what is, admittedly, a difficult situation. Before fetal viabil-
ity, the interests of the individual woman are paramount unless she
has failed to clearly state in a prior directive what should occur if she
becomes incompetent. After fetal viability, the state is still not allowed
to interfere in the decision as to what should occur. Nor may the state
ordain what should occur. The interests of the state are assuaged by
the fact that there can be no doubt that family and friends are also
interested in the fetal life as well as in the life and wishes of the incom-
petent pregnant woman.
The obvious criticisms of this proposal may center around the
viability distinction in this context and how a woman's prior directive
may be brought into question if she has clearly stated her wishes. In
237. The existence of a prior directive is "persuasive evidence of [the] incompetent
[pregnant woman's] intention and it should be given great weight by the person or per-
sons who substitute their judgment on [her] behalf." John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v.
Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
238. This subsection recognizes that many types of life-sustaining treatment may be
harmful to fetal development and allows the surrogate to consider this in their decision-
making. See, e.g., T.W. SADLER, LANMAN'S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 113-15 (5th ed. 1985) (ex-
amining the harmful effect of chemical agents and pharmaceutical drugs on the fetus).
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an ideal world such distinctions would never have to be made and
whatever the woman desired as expressed in her prior directive would
govern in all circumstances. Such an ideal world does not exist, how-
ever, and it must be recognized that the state can, and will, likely step
in when the fetus of a woman is viable, if not before that point. This is
clearly seen in the abortion rights cases239 and the forced cesarean
section cases.24 ° States have consistently intervened in the situation
where a woman is pregnant and she has attempted to exercise her
rights in contradiction to what her health care providers or the state
believe to be in the best interest of the unborn fetus. This proposal
recognizes that fact and attempts to cope with this reality.
The distinction between pre and post viability is recognized and
incorporated into this proposal because the United States Supreme
Court has made this distinction a part of the law of abortion. 241 The
Court would likely look to this law if it were to recognize the right to
forego medical treatment as a constitutionally protected privacy right
and apply it to the situation where a woman is pregnant and incompe-
tent. It is important to note that this proposal does not call into ques-
tion the wishes of an incompetent woman as expressed in her prior
directive. The proposal recognizes these wishes and requires that fam-
ily or friends take those wishes into account when making their deci-
sion as to what should be done.2 42 In light of current federal and state
law, the wishes of a woman that are clearly expressed in a prior direc-
tive, whether the fetus is pre or post viable, are far more likely to be
carried out by family or friends than by a health care provider or the
state acting alone. This is especially true if the fetus is viable. By rec-
ognizing this fact and by dealing with it directly, the first step is taken
toward moving the law to a better place.
By allowing family and friends to make the decision of whether to
forego life-sustaining treatment where a woman is incompetent and
pregnant with a viable fetus (or before viability, if her choice is not
clearly enunciated in her prior directive), we arrive at a method that
can best fit everyone's needs. Family and friends have the best inter-
ests of the woman, the fetus (and, consequently, the interest of the
state) in mind and know best the beliefs and desires of the woman at
the moment of incompetency. Throughout our lives we rely on family
and friends to protect our autonomy, to do what is best for us, and to
help us arrive at our decisions. This fact of life should not change at
239. See supra notes 80, 89-94.
240. See supra notes 127, 138-140.
241. See supra note 119.
242. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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the end of life when we are most in need of the ones that have sup-
ported us throughout life.
By adopting a caring, substituted judgment standard, which is a
"shared decision-making process:"
individual participants are able to view each other not as ad-
versaries, but as partners in reaching the resolution of a diffi-
cult problem. Then, after a decision is made, there is not
enmity, but connection. This paves the way for future rela-
tions of mutual respect, rather than malpractice litigation, or
rifts within the family. Accordingly, just as is the case with
alternative dispute resolution, the process of conversation, of
structuring a decisionmaking model on the basis of human
connection rather than on a hierarchy of rights and rules,
enhances both the quality of the decision made and the par-
ticipants' acceptance of it.
24 3
Such is the import of this proposal. It may not be perfect, but it is
workable, clear, and best addresses the various competing interests in
such a manner that the state will not dictate its decisions to the indi-
viduals involved.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that pregnancy clauses in prior directive statutes must
be changed. As currently written, they violate common-law and con-
stitutional rights of women, as well as leave the state of the law unclear
and ambiguous. This is especially true before the fetus reaches
viability.
Once the fetus is viable, however, the state's interest becomes
compelling. That should not, however, override the autonomy of the
incompetent pregnant woman as expressed and exercised through
her family and friends in consideration of her prior directive and by
their personal knowledge of the woman. Through a "caring substi-
tuted judgement" model, we can best effectuate the interests of all in
an admittedly difficult circumstance.
TIMOTHYJ. BURCH
243. Fentiman, supra note 160, at 846.
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